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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MORRIS W. TOLD and ELAINE
TOLD,

)

Petitioners <and Appellants, )
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENTS,

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT
OF APPEALS

)
Case No. 890174
Priority Category 13

Respondent.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to

review issues not presented for decision to the Court of
Appeals?
2.

Should this Court consider reviewing the denial of

a zoning variance when the petitioner has never even
attempted to meet the statutory grounds for the granting of
a variance?
3.

Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to

review factual issues concerning the denial of a zoning
variance?
4.

Should sanctions pursuant to Rule 40(a) and Rule

33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, be granted for the
petitioner's frivolous, harassing and delaying petition?
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Court of Appeals determined to review the District
Court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of the City Board

of
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(3) to authorize upon appeal such variance
from the terms of the ordinance as will not
be contrary to the public interest, where
owing to special conditions a literal
enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary
ha. irdship; provided, that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed and substantial
justice done. Before any variance may be
authorized, however, it shall be shown that:
It is barely possible to ascertain from the maundering
cirgument of the Petition shadowy out! I nes of reliance on
Rule 4 3 ( 1 ) , (3) and ( 4 ) .

(a) The variance will not substantially
affect the comprehensive plan of zoning in
the city and that adherence to the strict
letter of the ordinance will cause
difficulties and hardships, the imposition of
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in
order to carry out the general purpose of the
plan.
(b) Special circumstances attached to the
property covered by the application which do
not generally apply to the other property in
the same district.
(c) That because of said special
circumstances, property covered by
application is deprived of privileges
possessed by other properties in the same
district; and that the granting of the
variance is essential to the enjoyment of a
substantial property right possessed by other
property in the same district.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arose from the Salt Lake City Board of
Adjustment ("the Board") denying the petitioners
Tolds") a variance for an illegal carport.

("the

The petitioners

have never even attempted to meet any of the standards for
the grant of a variance as required by Section 10-9-12(3),
U.C.A.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After the Toldsf variance request was denied by the
Board the Tolds appealed the decision to the Third Judicial
District Court pursuant to Section 10-9-15, U.C.A..
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their illegal carport from the Board which was denied by the
Board on March 1, 1987.
4.

(R. 79, Findings No. 9.)

The Tolds again petitioned the Board relying on

Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976) and
presented a list of allegedly similar violations near their
property.
5.

(R. 79, Findings No. 10.)
Never, throughout the entire course of the

proceeding below (including the District Court and the Court
of Appeals), have the Tolds submitted evidence of any
"special circumstance" attached to their property not
generally applicable to other properties in their same
zoning district as required by Section 10-9-12(3)(b).

Nor

have they ever submitted any evidence why the nonexistent
special circumstances "deprived" them of any privileges
possessed by other properties in the same district denying
them the "enjoyment of a substantial property right," as
required by Section 10-9-12(3)(c).

Further the record is

devoid of any evidence of any attempt to show any
"difficulties and hardships" (except the Tolds obvious
disregard of the law) as required for a variance by Section
10-9-12(3)(a).

(See entire record and the City's Brief to

the Court of Appeals, p. 11.)
6.

Because of an absolute and total failure to meet

any of the standards for a variance required by Section 109-12(3) the Board again denied the requested variance
holding, in part, that the Board, "could find no unusual

condition attached to [the Tolds] property which would
deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of
his property which would justify the granting of the
requested variance."
7.

(R. 79, Finding No, 10.)

Upon being presented with the Told f s list of

alleged nearby violations the City promptly and thoroughly
investigated the alleged violations.

The City took

immediate action against those properties which were
determined to be, in fact, in violation of the ordinance.
(R. 79-80, Findings No. 11-19. ) 3
8.

The City's zoning enforcement personnel usually

become aware of zoning violations in three ways:
(a)

When plans are submitted;

(b)

When neighbors complain; and

(c)

Occasionally, by a zoning inspector viewing a

construction activity not in compliance with zoning.

Throughout the Petition for Writ there are numerous
insinuations that the City is in some way lying about its
enforcement efforts. For example on page 5 the Petition
twice intimates that only "allegedly" were some of the other
violations ordered to comply. On page 6 a similar
insinuation uses the word "supposedly." This Court is not
the grounds for factual dispute which have long since been
settled against the Tolds' arguments. The City's counsel
takes personal umbrage at the insulting phraseology of the
Petition. The City has done precisely what it claimed in
its Affidavits to have done without any weasely
qualifications. This factual quibbling and insulting is yet
another reasons that sanctions should be granted against the
Tolds as more fully specified in Point II, below.

This City f s financial resources are not sufficient to
hire enough building inspectors to catch every violation
before construction is completed.

Thus, the City relies

heavily on being informed of violations by citizens.

This

is especially true where, as here, the illegal construction
was done without a permit.

(R. 78, Findings No. 3 and 4.)

POINT I
THERE ARE NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT
REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.
A.

INTRODUCTION

The Petition should be denied for several reasons.
First, fifty percent of the Petition is an attempt to raise
issues which were never raised at the Court of Appeals.
Second, even though the Tolds and their counsel have now
taken four bites at the apple of a variance they have
totally failed to even attempt compliance with the statutory
grounds for issuing a variance.

Third, there is no special

and important reason, and certainly none of those listed in
Rule 43, R.U.S.C., for the Writ to issue.

Fourth, none of

the various "throw everything against the kitch€»n wall and
hope some of it sticks" allegations of error below are
correct.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW ISSUES
NOT RAISED BELOW.

The Board can find no reported cases arising under Rule
42, R.U.S.C., concerning this Court's scope of review of

decisions from the Court of Appeals on certiorari.

The

general principle of law is that a higher appellate court
will not review matters not raised in the intermediate court
of appeals.

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976);

Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976); Walters v. City of
St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Murrow v. Daniels, 364
S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 1988); Personnel Board v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d
13 (Ky.App. 1986); L & H Transport, Inc. v. Drew Agency,
Inc., 403 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1987); Morgan v. Compugraphic
Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984); Settlemyer v. Wilmington
Veterans Post No. 49, American Legion, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 521
(Ohio 1984); Parrell v. Keenan, 452 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. 1983);
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210
(111. 1983); Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492 (Wash.
1983); Centers v. Yehezkely, 706 P.2d 105 (Idaho App. 1985).
The logic behind this rule is the same as this Court's
refusal to consider issues on appeal not raised by the trial
court.

That is, this Court is entitled to the benefit of

informed opinions below to frame the issues for decision.
Absent such preservation of issues below, this Court will
generally not consider an issue for the first time.

Buehner

Block Company v. U.W.C. Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah
1988); Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. North American
Title Insurance Company, 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988); Mascaro
v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).

More than half of the Petition for Writ consists of
matters not raised at the Court of Appeals.

The Petition's

"third and final reason" alleged for this Court to issue the
Writ of Certiorari (Petition p. 12-14) paints a bizarre
Orwellian nightmare world where citizens are forced, against
their will and in their complete innocence, to rat on their
neighbors for their own protection.

The illogic of this

argument is pointed out in Section I.E.(4) of this Brief
below.

For now, the Board simply points out that this

screed was never raised in the Court of Appeals.
Further, the Petition's argument (Petition p. 6-8) that
the District Court's consideration of the Board's Affidavit
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment somehow
violated Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City,
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) was also never raised below.
Finally, the Petition's contention that somehow the City was
"intentionally" discriminating in its enforcement against
the petitioner (Petition p. 8-9) has never been properly
raised.

There has never been a shred of evidence of any

"intent" to discriminate against the Tolds.

The Tolds are

simply repeated offenders who were caught and now try to
excuse their hands being in the cookie jar by pointing to
others with chocolate chip fingerprints.

(The absurdity of

the intentional discrimination argument will be further
shown in Section I.E.(3) of this Brief below.)

C.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
OVERTURNING THE TWO LOWER COURTS
AND GRANTING A VARIANCE WHEN THERE
HAS BEEN NO ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORY STANDARDS.

The standards for granting a variance are set out in
Section 10-9-12(3), (a)-(c), U.C.A.

This Court expounded on

the standards in Xanthos, supra at 1036-37:
What must be shown by the applicant for the
variance is that the property itself
contained some special circumstances that
relate to the hardship complained of and that
granting a variance to take this into account
would not substantially affect the zoning
plan.
* * *

Hardship is not demonstrated by economic loss
alone. It must be tied to the special
circumstances, none of which have been proven
here. Every person requesting a variance can
indicate some economic loss. To allow
variance any time any economic loss is
alleged would make a mockery of the zoning
program. Further, the [plaintiffs] brought
their losses upon themselves. The application [for building permit] affirmatively
alleged to the City that no dwelling existed
on the land upon which he proposed to build
duplexes, and the City relied on those
allegations.
(Emphasis added.)
Before the Board, before the District Court, before the
Court of Appeals and in this Petition, the Tolds have not
even attempted to meet the requirements of the statute.

The

Tolds have never shown any "special circumstances attached
to [their property]."

They have never shown how these

nonexistent "special circumstances" are "essential to the

enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by
others in the district."
All the Tolds have said before the Board, the District
Court, the Court of Appeals and in this Petition is that
because some of their neighbors have constructed similar
illegal structures the Tolds must then, ipso facto, be
allowed to construct their own illegal structure.

The

argument of the Tolds, in their Petition, can be summarized
as "fourteen wrongs make a right."

They do not.

There is

no provision in the statutory grant of authority to the
Board for the issuance of variances to consider that other
4
similar illegalities may exist.
At each level of this
proceeding the Board had pointed out to the Tolds their
failure to meet the statutory requirements.

Despite three

bites at the apple they continue before this Court to not
even bother attempting to comply with the statute.

As their

repeated illegal buildings are subject to zoning sanctions
so their repeated failure to brief the controlling issue of
this case should also be the subject of sanctions as
discussed more fully in Point II below.

It might be argued that the existence of other similar
violations goes to meet part 3(a) of the test for granting a
variance (that the variance will not "substantially affect
the comprehensive plan"). But this Court held in Xanthos
that the tests of Section 10-9-12(3) are cumulative and
written in the conjunctive. All the tests must be met
before the variance can legally be issued.

D.

THERE ARE NOT "SERIOUS AND
IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR THIS COURT
TO REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION.

The Court of Appeals found the Toldsf contentions to be
so unmeritorious as to warrant Rule 31, no-opinion,
consideration.

The trial court considered the matter on

cross Motions for Summary Judgment and issued detailed
Findings and Conclusions thoroughly supported by
unchallenged evidence.

In essence, the case boils down to a

repeated lawbreaker seeking an indulgence simply because
others have broken the same law.

There is no way, despite

the plaintive Jeremiad of the Petition, for this Court to
find "serious and important" reasons to give comfort and
solace to an unrepentant recidivist.
E.

NONE OF THE ALLEGED ERRORS BELOW
ARE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW.

(1)

THE PETITION'S ATTEMPT TO RAISE
FACTUAL ISSUES IS INAPPROPRIATE.

The Petition brings up at least two factual issues
never considered below and totally unsupported by the
record.

First, the Petition pulls from the air an

allegation of intentional discrimination.

(Petition, p. 8.)

As noted above and below there is absolutely no evidence of
any intentional discrimination against the Tolds.
The petitioners also now ask this Court to reverse the
trial court's Summary Judgment (on cross-motions) to make a
factual determination as to whether or not an evidentiary

hearing should have been held on issues of arbitrariness and
capriciousness.

(Petition p. 11.)

Again, this issue was

never raised in the Court of Appeals and there is nothing in
the record before this Court, the Court of Appeals or the
District Court indicating any dispute about the evidence.
This is not a Sixth Amendment denial of effective counsel
argument.

At some point the finality of review should drive

a stake through the heart of the petitioner's vampirous
failure to give up their meritless arguments.
(2)

EVIDENCE OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
NOT IMPROPER.

The Toldsf only objection to the Board's evidence
before the District Court of enforcement on other violations
can be found in one sentence on page 5 of the petitioners?
Memorandum to the District Court in opposition to
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment:
The defendant's enforcement of the
ordinance against the fourteen other
residents is not relevant to this case
and should not be considered when
deciding this matter.
(R. 56.)
That is the sum total of their objection to the
evidence.
wrong.

The objection is both legally and factually

It is legally wrong because it is clear from

Kartchner that this Court considered the lack of enforcement
evidence to be relevant and controlling on the issue of
estoppel:

Witnesses for the County conceded at least
six similar violations of the setback
ordinance within the vicinity of defendantf s
property, and there was no evidence to
indicate any attempt to enforce the zoning
law in these other instances.
Kartchner, supra at 140.

(Emphasis added.)

The Toldsf argument is also factually wrong because
enforcement actions are factually relevant.

It is not

possible for the City to hire enough building inspectors to
catch every violator before their building is completed.
This is especially true where the illegal construction is
done without a permit such as in this case.
Findings No. 4.)

(R. 78,

The City's zoning enforcement personnel

usually become aware of zoning violations either when the
plans are submitted, when neighbors complain or,
occasionally, when a zoning inspector fortuitously catching
construction activity in progress.

(R. 78, Findings No. 3.)

In this case it would have been impossible to catch the
Toldsf violations by plans because they failed to obtain a
permit.

In any event, the Tolds had a past history of

filing improper and distorted plans concealing the true
facts.

(R. 78, Findings Nos. 5-8.)

As for the neighboring

violations they were caught due to the Tolds' complaint.
The Tolds somehow argue that since they pointed out the
neighboring violations to the Board not only are the Tolds
immune from enforcement but so are the neighbors.
Tolds1 Brief pp. 17-18.)

(See

The argument that one violator can

insulate himself, and other violators, from any enforcement
by merely pointing out the other violations is so lacking in
logic and inherently absurd that it does not deserve a
reply.

Such a rule of law would eviscerate the City's

zoning enforcement.
(3)

THERE WAS NO IMPROPER
DISCRIMINATION

The Petition's argument analogizing the City's actions
to an excuse for racial discrimination is absurd and
insulting.

First, there is no evidence of any intent on

behalf of the City to discriminate at all.

Second, the City

is unaware of any cases holding scoflaws to be a protected
class.

Third, discrimination in enforcement of zoning

ordinances, by the mere fact that it is impossible to catch
every violator, is expected, accepted and approved.

In Cook

v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1977) the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered an argument similar to that raised by this
Petition:
Rather, appellant merely claims
discrimination in that the ordinance was not
enforced against other known violators. . . .
For ninety years it has been established that
a law fair on its face may be applied so
arbitrarily and unfairly as to amount to a
violation of constitutional rights. . . .
However, when the discrimination is not aimed
at a "suspect class" a plaintiff must show
intentional or purposeful discrimination.
Mere failure to prosecute other offenders is
no basis for a finding of denial of equal

protection. !f[T]he conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation."
• • • Selective enforcement without
malicious intent may be justified when a test
case is needed to clarify doubtful law, . . .
or when officials seek to prosecute a
particularly egregious violation and thereby
deter other violators. . . .
(Citations omitted, emphasis added.)5 6
(4)

THERE ARE NO ORWELLIAN CONSEQUENCES
TO THE CITY'S ACTIONS.

The ToldsT hysterical charge that the City's practice
is a fatal threat to American Democracy (Petition p. 13) is
ludicrous.

There is no requirement that neighbors rat on

each other about zoning violations.

However, if a zoning

violator chooses to rely on an estoppel defense based on
neighboring violations what would the Tolds have the City
do?

Would the petitioner merely have to come in and say:

"There are other violations in my neighborhood but I'm not
going to tell you where they are."

This Court cannot

sanction such an Easter egg hunt system of zoning.

To the

Before the Court of Appeals the petitioners deliberately
attempted to mislead that Court by citing only the one
sentence in the above quotation of basic law barely
favorable to their position. The petitioners totally failed
to cite or point out to the Court the fact that the entire
quote destroys their argument.
The Tenth Circuit also took note that the appellee in Cook
informed the Court that the deterent effect of enforcement
worked, as other violators ceased their illegal practices.
Cook, supra at 701. In the instant case the successful
deterrent and corrective effects are already a matter of
record. (R. 79-80, Findings No. 11-19.)

extent a repeat offender chooses to point fingers at other
violators the City should at least be entitled to know where
the finger is pointing.
POINT II.
THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED SANCTIONS
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND PETITIONERS'
COUNSEL FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS, HARASSING
AND DELAYING APPEAL.
As noted in Point I above, the Petition fails in
numerous respects to comply with the Rules of this Court.
There is no proper statement for the basis of jurisdiction;
there is no quotation of controlling statutes; there is no
citation to the record; and, there is no statement of any
"special and important reason" for the grant of the Writ.
Further, in violation of all basic precepts of
appellate review, the Petition asks this Court to review
numerous arguments not presented to the trial Court or the
Court of Appeals.

(The most egregious example is the Tolds

asking this Court to send the matter back for a factual
determination at the District Court when the issue was
decided below on cross Motions for Summary Judgments and
this supposed factual dispute was never raised to the Court
of Appeals.)

Thirdly, for the fourth time the Tolds have

failed absolutely to even attempt compliance with the
statutory grounds for the grant of a variance.

Despite the

City's repeated pointing out of this omission the Petition
glaringly fails to make any attempt at compliance.

Further,

none of the alleged errors of the Court of Appeals are
argued with any logic or proper citations to cases or the
record.

A mere whining hysterical lamentation is not

sufficient grounds for the issuance of a Writ.
Finally, the petitioners' cynical attempt to take
advantage of this Court's backlog and delay, to extend the
time for compliance with the City's zoning ordinances, makes
a mockery of justice.

As noted in this Brief, and in the

District Court's Order, a number of the other violators
pointed out by the Tolds have complied with the City's
ordinances.

Other who refused have been prosecuted.

Only

the Tolds have obstinately maintained their violation of the
law.

To allow the Tolds continuing bad faith tactics to

prevail without sanctions would be an insult to those who
have complied.
This Petition violates Rule 33(a) in that it is clearly
frivolous and for the purpose of delay.

It also violates

Rule 40(a) in that there could be no good faith grounds
formed after reasonable inquiry for this Court to grant the
Writ.
As in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), the
Tolds' mischaracterization of the record, failure to follow
the rules, abuse of appellate process and other
transgressions warrants the imposition of sanctions.

See

also, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App.

1989); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 750
P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
CONCLUSION
There are no special and important reasons to grant the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The Petition should be

dismissed and the City should be awarded sanctions against
the Tolds and the Toldsf counsel for violations of rules
33(a) and 40(a), R.U.S.C.
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